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Abstract 
In the present study, we investigate the impact of discounts on the valuation performance of initial public 
offerings. Review of existing literature reveals that such valuation performance lacks examination in terms of 
discounts as most studies focus on valuation methods. Accordingly, we examine the valuation performance of 
initial public offerings before and after applying discounts. Whereby, underwriters apply a deliberate discount 
to fair value estimate before setting the final offer price. We assess the valuation performance of initial public 
offerings through bias and accuracy errors as well as explainability. When valuation errors are low, the 
valuation performance is deemed superior. Our sample consists of 39 initial public offerings conducted on the 
Moroccan stock exchange between 2004 and 2018. We use publicly available prospectus to collect necessary 
data. Our results reveal that discounts applied to fair value estimate when setting the final offer price reduce 
valuation errors. Consequently, discounts enhance the valuation performance of initial public offerings. In fact, 
both optimistic and pessimistic final offer price are closer to market price in comparison with optimistic and 
pessimistic fair value estimate. We conclude that if valuations conducted by underwriters are objective, 
discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation 
incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to initial public offerings. This 
indicates the superior fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if valuations 
conducted by underwriters are subjective, then underwriters deliberately overestimates fair value estimate to 
justify applying discounts when setting the final offer price. Nonetheless, our study reveals that discounts are 
more than proportional to valuation optimism. Consequently, while discounts absorb this valuation optimism, 
they also set a valuation pessimism. In other words, discounts avoid overpricing initial public offerings, yet 
they result in underpricing them. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic fair value estimate and 
pessimistic final offer price have approximate valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable 
underpricing initial public offerings than overpricing them.  
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Introduction 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) mark a crucial step in a firm’s lifespan, yet setting the offer price is beset by 
several challenges. IPOs valuation process as documented by Roosenboom (2012) starts with individual 
estimates produced by each valuation method used. Next, fair value estimate (FVE) is computed as the 
weighted average of all individual estimates. Then, preliminary offer price (POP) is computed by applying 
discount. Last, final offer price (FOP) is set by incorporating price updates. It is worth noting that these updates 
are applicable for bookbuilding offerings only. Consequently, POP and FOP are identical for fixed priced 
offerings as they are not subject to price updates, which is the case of our study. Most studies that examine 
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IPOs valuation performance compare valuation errors, in terms of bias and accuracy as well as explainabiliy, 
using different valuation methods. When valuation errors are low, valuation performance is deemed superior. 
Empirical results show that popular valuation methods have similar valuation performance (Berkman et al., 
2000; Courteau et al., 2006; Deloof et al., 2009; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020). 
Deloof et al. (2009), Rasheed et al. (2018) and Roosenboom (2012) further investigate determinants of weights 
assigned to each valuation methods’ individual estimates. Moreover, Deloof et al. (2009) and Kim & Ritter 
(1999) examine FOP with regard to information incorporated by underwriters. However, although discount 
plays an important role in IPOs valuation, no study examined its effect on valuation performance. Surprisingly, 
even those studies for which discounts data are available focused on valuation methods (Deloof et al., 2009; 
Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020). This is mainly due to the public unavailability of 
discounts data (Tutuncu, 2020). 
Through the literature review section, we identify a major research gap: IPOs valuation performance lacks 
examination in terms of discounts. Accordingly, our study focus on examining the impact of discounts on IPOs 
valuation performance. In other words, we examine whether discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP 
increase or rather decrease valuation errors. Our results reveal that discounts reduce valuation errors, which 
enhances IPOs valuation performance. We conclude that if valuations conducted by underwriters are objective, 
discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation 
incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to IPOs. Additionally, these 
discounts indicate the superior fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if 
valuations conducted are subjective, then underwriters deliberately overestimates FVE to justify applying 
discounts when setting FOP. Nonetheless, our study reveals that discounts are more than proportional to 
valuation optimism. Consequently, while discounts absorb this valuation optimism, they also set a valuation 
pessimism, which results in IPOs underpricing. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic FVE and 
pessimistic FOP have approximate valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable underpricing IPOs than 
overpricing them. Our study makes two key contributions to the literature regarding IPOs valuation 
performance. First, we provide exclusive comparison of FVE and FOP in terms of bias and accuracy errors as 
well as explainability. Second, we show that discounts enhance IPOs valuation performance. 
We believe that the Moroccan stock exchange is interesting to study as it is subject to fixed priced offerings 
only. Unlike bookbuilding offerings, fixed priced ones are not subject to price updates following investors’ 
indications of interest before setting FOP. Instead, only discounts mark the last stage of IPOs valuation. 
Accordingly, this allows us to examine the impact of discounts on IPOs valuation performance by comparing 
between estimates pre-discounts (FVE) and estimates post-discounts (FOP). Such examination is possible 
because of the public availability of discounts following the modification of IPOs prospectus model in 2004. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: section 2 outlines related literature, section 3 presents 
methodology, section 4 reports results and develops discussions and section 5 highlights main conclusions. 
1. Related literature  
Studies investigating IPOs valuation performance mainly focus on valuation methods. Results show that 
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF), Dividend Discount Model (DDM) and Price-Earnings multiple (P/E) have 
similar accuracy errors (Berkman et al., 2000; Deloof et al., 2009; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995; Roosenboom, 
2012). Roosenboom (2012) additionally finds similar bias errors and explainability between these three 
methods. Contrarily, Tutuncu (2020) discovers that DCF is more biased and less accurate than multiples. 
Hence, underwriters must tradeoff between positive and negative aspects of each valuation method when 
valuing IPOs (Baker & Ruback, 1999; Courteau et al., 2006; Kaplan & Ruback, 1995). Furthermore, Deloof 
et al. (2009), Rasheed et al. (2018) and Roosenboom (2012) study determinants of weights assigned to 
individual estimates of each valuation methods. They conclude that the choice of underwriters depends on firm 
characteristics and aggregate stock market returns and volatility. Moreover, when examining FOP, Deloof et 
al. (2009) and Kim & Ritter (1999) document its superiority in comparison with other estimates of IPOs 
valuation process. They explain that underwriters are capable of performing superior fundamental analysis by 
incorporating valuable information about IPOs demand collected during roadshows. These studies show that 
IPOs valuation performance have been examined considerably in terms of valuation methods, weights assigned 
to each method and price updates, yet not in terms of discounts. Actually, we were unable to find any study 
that assessed discounts’ impact on IPOs valuation performance. Surprisingly, even those studies for which 
discounts data are available focused on valuation methods (Deloof et al., 2009; Rasheed et al., 2018; 
Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020). 
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Generally, studies examining discounts in IPOs context are uncommon. This is mainly because of the 
unavailability of discounts data to the public. In fact, discounts data became available only recently in some 
European markets following the modification of regulation (Tutuncu, 2020). Most studies that have access to 
discounts data document that underwriters apply discounts when valuing IPOs before setting FOP (Cassia et 
al., 2004; Deloof et al., 2009; Paleari et al., 2014; Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; 
Vismara et al., 2015). Deloof et al. (2009) discover that IPOs are deliberately underpriced by applying 
discounts before setting FOP. Through interviews, underwriters explain that they do so in order to present a 
good opportunity to all IPOs participants. Similarly, Roosenboom (2012) reports that underwriters apply 
discounts to FVE to reach POP when valuing bookbuilding IPOs. Part of this discount is recovered by positive 
price updates while the other part remains and contributes to IPO underpricing. Contrarily, Cassia et al. (2004), 
Paleari et al. (2014) and Vismara et al. (2015) document that discounts do not fully offset the optimistic bias 
and leaves IPOs overpriced. They explain that underwriters use discounts to make IPOs appear conservative. 
In fact, these studies reveal that underwriters select in a biased way peers in order to deliberately overestimate 
IPOs. Tutuncu (2020) shows that discounts depend mainly on optimistic valuation bias and do not lead to 
significant initial returns as expected by IPOs underpricing theories. Jeribi & Jarboui (2014, 2015) document 
that underwriters use discounts to promote institutional investors. Tizniti & Aasri (2021) on their part show 
that the discount applied to FVE when setting FOP is composed of two components: a justified part qualified 
as warranted discount and an unjustified part qualified as unwarranted discount. They document that warranted 
discounts enhance IPOs valuation performance while unwarranted discounts increase IPOs underpricing. 
2. Methodology 
Our sample consist of 39 IPOs conducted on the Casablanca stock exchange in Morocco from 2004 to 2018. 
Data about FVE, discounts, FOP and market prices (MP) were all hand collected from the Moroccan stock 
exchange’s website. Accordingly, IPOs with missing FVE or discounts data were omitted from our study. 
Consistent with prior studies, we use both 1st day and average 1st month MP (Berkman et al., 2000; Deloof et 
al., 2009; Kim & Ritter, 1999; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020). Additionally, as suggested by Ljungqvist 
(2007), we do not base our study solely on 1st day MP since the Moroccan exchange applies a volatility limit 
of 10% for newly listed equities. Because we found that both MP lead to the same conclusions, we refer to the 
average 1st month MP, unless otherwise stated. 
We compare between FVE and FOP, whereby the only difference between the two is discounts. This enables 
us to examine discounts’ impact on IPO valuation performance. IPOs valuation performance is examined 
through bias and accuracy errors as well as explainability. In this context, the term error is not considered in 
its strict sense; rather it is a quantitative indication of the distance between estimates (FVE or FOP) and MP 
(Deloof et al., 2009). When valuation errors are low, valuation performance is deemed superior. Some papers 
compute valuation errors using the percentage measure ((estimates – MP) / MP) while other papers use the log 
measure (ln (estimates / MP) (Dittmann & Maug, 2008). However, Dittmann & Maug (2008) show that both 
error measures lead to the same ranking and error signs. It is worth noting that all of these papers assume either 
implicitly or explicitly a certain degree of market efficiency by considering that MP reflect the true value of 
equities and that they represent an appropriate standard for assessing IPOs valuation performance.  
For the purpose of this study, bias error is computed in percent as the difference between FVE (FOP) and MP 
on MP, while accuracy error is the absolute value of bias error. However, as bias errors incorporate both 
positive and negative errors, they are subject to a compensation effect between optimistic and pessimistic 
valuations that might meddle with our study’s conclusions. Hence, we also examine bias and accuracy errors 
by making a distinction between optimistic and pessimistic valuations. Whereby, optimistic valuations are 
estimates that are superior to MP and pessimistic valuations are estimates that are inferior to MP. This also 
enables us to account for eventual differences between optimistic and pessimistic estimates in terms of 
valuation errors. Unless otherwise stated, we construct our analysis based on the median instead of the mean 
as it is more robust to outliers. This is consistent with Dittmann & Maug (2008) who suggest to report the 
median when using the percentage measure for two main reasons: first, the median percentage error is 
indicative of both the median and the mean log error and second, the median and the mean percentage error 
don’t always lead to the same conclusions.  
For explainabiliy we use cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) univariate regression as previous studies 
(Berkman et al., 2000; Deloof et al., 2009; Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012) : 
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Ln (MP) = β0 + β1Ln(FVE) + εi                                                                                                                                                                                            (1) 
Ln (MP) = β0 + β1Ln(FOP) + εi                                                                                                                                                                                            (2) 
3. Results and discussions 
Examining general valuation errors lead to conflicting results. Table 3 reveals that FVE (-1.23%) are less 
biased than FOP (-12.53%), which indicates that FVE are closer to MP in comparison with FOP. These results 
suggest that discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP increase valuation errors. Conversely, table 4 reveals 
that FOP (12.53%) are more accurate than FVE (14.25%), which indicates that FOP are closer to MP in 
comparison with FVE. These results suggest that discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP rather decrease 
valuation errors. Central tendency further supports this latter suggestion as FOP (56.41%) have more central 
tendency than FVE (51.28%). These results are also consistent with previous studies that reported FOP small 
errors in comparison with other estimates (Deloof et al., 2009; Kim & Ritter, 1999). However, these studies 
account for the impact of price updates, instead of discounts as our study does, on IPOs valuation performance. 
Deloof et al. (2009) document that mean accuracy errors decrease from a range of [22.1% - 34.4%] when 
referring to individual estimates to a range of [20.4% - 22.1%] when referring to FOP. 
We believe that the inconsistent results general valuation errors, bias and accuracy, lead to are due to the 
compensation effect between positive and negative errors as explained in the methodology section. 
Accordingly, examining specific valuation errors, bias and accuracy, lead to consistent results. Table 3 and 4 
reveal that valuation errors are more pronounced for both optimistic (16.82%) and pessimistic (10.13%) FVE 
in comparison with FOP (7.18% and 15.39%). Whereby, both optimistic and pessimistic FOP are less biased 
and more accurate than FVE. In other words, optimistic and pessimistic FOP are closer to MP in comparison 
with FVE. In fact, optimistic FVE errors (16.82%) are superior than optimistic FOP errors (7.18%). And 
although pessimistic FOP errors (15.39%) are superior than pessimistic FVE errors (10.13%), they do not 
exceed in extent optimistic FVE errors (16.82%). These findings suggest that discounts applied to FVE when 
setting FOP decrease valuation errors, which enhances IPOs valuation performance. Univariate regression 
analysis documents consistent results. Table 5 reveals that FOP (Adj. R²: 92.31%) better explain MP variations 
than FVE (Adj. R²: 91.73%). Both results are statistically significant at 1% level and indicate that discounts 
applied to FVE when setting FOP allow better explanation of MP. Additionally, FOP intercept is closer to one 
(1.03) while slope is closer to zero (-0.01), in comparison with FVE (intercept 1.05 and slope -0.27). Slopes 
of both estimates are significant at 1% level while intercepts are insignificant. Berkman et al. (2000) and 
Roosenboom (2012) explain that slope should equal one and intercept zero if valuations are unbiased and 
accurate. Hence, results reveal that FOP are less biased and more accurate than FVE. These findings further 
indicate that discounts reduce valuation errors, which enhances IPOs valuation performance. Using the same 
regression model where FVE is the independent variable, Roosenboom (2012) documents a superior Adj. R² 
(94.39%) with an intercept of -0.124 and a slope of 1.017. 
Furthermore, we find that FVE are mainly optimistic (19/39 observations), while FOP is mainly pessimistic 
(33/39 observations). These findings reveal that valuations conducted by underwriters lead to FVE mainly 
optimistic with regard to MP. Additionally, underwriters seem to be conscious of this valuation optimism, 
hence they proceed into applying discounts. These discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP help absorb 
valuation optimism, which decreases valuation errors and enhances IPOs valuation performance. Nonetheless, 
these discounts are more than proportional to valuation optimism because they establishes a valuation 
pessimism, which results in IPOs underpricing. Similarly, specific valuation errors reveal that pessimistic FVE 
(10.13%) are closer to MP than optimistic ones (16.82%). As these optimistic FVE are more biased and less 
accurate, it seems justified to apply discounts to reduce the extent of valuation optimism. However, we 
curiously notice a shift in our results after applying discounts to FVE when setting FOP. Whereby, optimistic 
FOP (7.18%) become closer to MP than pessimistic ones (15.39%). These findings clearly indicate that 
discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP are not proportional to valuation optimism. Actually, as long as 
optimistic FVE cross the zero line and change to pessimistic FOP, we can clearly deduce that discounts applied 
are more than proportional. Consequently, this results in the underpricing of IPOs. This line of reasoning is 
consistent with the results of Tizniti & Aasri (2021). In their study, Tizniti & Aasri (2021) show that the 
discount applied to FVE when setting FOP is composed of two components, a justified part qualified as 
warranted discount and unjustified part qualified as unwarranted discount. They document that warranted 
discounts enhance IPOs valuation performance while unwarranted discounts increase IPOs underpricing. 
Surprisingly, it is worth noting that accuracy errors of optimistic FVE (16.82%) are approximate to those of 
pessimistic FOP (15.39%). We do not believe that this similarity is a mere coincidence. In fact, this suggests 
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that underwriters seem to prefer pessimistic valuations to optimistic ones. In other words, underwriters are 
more comfortable underpricing IPOs rather than overpricing them. This is consistent with the expectation that 
underwriters have more to lose by overpricing IPOs than by underpricing them, for instance in terms of 
litigation and reputation (Hensler, 1995; Hughes & Thakor, 1992; Ljungqvist, 2007; Tiniç, 1988). 
This valuation optimism present in our findings is consistent with previous studies that reported deliberate 
optimism due to underwriters’ discretion (Cassia et al., 2004; Derrien, 2005; Paleari et al., 2014; Roosenboom, 
2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015). Derrien (2005) finds that although French IPOs provide positive 
initial returns, they are overpriced at time of offering over their long run value. Cassia et al. (2004) show that 
Italian IPOs valuation conducted by analysts ignore multiples or exclude peers that make IPOs appear 
overvalued. Similarly, Roosenboom (2012) reveals that French IPOs valuation conducted by underwriters 
using different valuation methods results in optimistic estimates. Paleari et al. (2014) and Vismara et al. (2015) 
document that IPOs valuation performance depends on underwriters’ biased selection of peers. These studies 
mutually explain that underwriters deliberately overvalue IPOs to justify applying high discounts when setting 
FOP. We argue that two different explanations can be provided regarding valuation optimism, depending on 
whether valuations conducted are objective or rather subjective. If valuations conducted by underwriters are 
objective, then FVE generated are optimistic merely from following guidelines of valuation methods used. 
Under such scenario, discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP serve as a qualitative valuation that 
supplements the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation indicates the superior fundamental analysis 
underwriters are capable of performing. As repeat player, underwriters collect relevant information about 
IPOs’ market circumstances, particularly in terms of demand (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). Hence, discounts 
applied by underwriters prove to enhance IPOs valuation performance because they result in FOP closer to 
MP. This reasoning is consistent with Deloof et al. (2009) and Kim & Ritter (1999). Both argue that 
underwriters play an important role in IPOs valuation, especially when setting FOP. Nonetheless, if valuations 
conducted by underwriters are subjective rather than objective, then FVE generated are intentionally 
optimistic. This reasoning is consistent with prior studies arguing that underwriters’ discretion gives them the 
opportunity to apply discounts as they please when valuing IPOs (Cassia et al., 2004; Derrien, 2005; Paleari 
et al., 2014; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015). However, most of these studies report 
persistence of valuation optimism even after discounts, which is contrary to our findings. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of discounts on the valuation performance of IPOs in Morocco using 
publicly available prospectus. We discover that discounts applied to FVE when setting FOP reduce valuation 
errors, which enhance IPOs valuation performance. We conclude that if valuations conducted are objective, 
discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation 
incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to IPOs. This indicates the superior 
fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if valuations conducted are subjective, 
then underwriters deliberately overestimates FVE to justify applying discounts when setting FOP. Nonetheless, 
our study reveals that discounts are more than proportional to valuation optimism. Consequently, while 
discounts absorb this valuation optimism, they also set a valuation pessimism, which results in IPOs 
underpricing. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic FVE and pessimistic FOP have approximate 
valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable underpricing IPOs than overpricing them.  
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Table 1. Distribution of sample by type of shares offered and type of offering 
Years 





New and existing 
shares 
Fixed price Open price 
2004  1  1  1 
2005 1 2  1 2 3 
2006 3 3 2 6 2 8 
2007 2 5 2 5 4 9 
2008 2 1 2 3 2 5 
2010  2  2  2 
2011 1 1 1 3  3 
2012  1  1  1 
2013 1   1  1 
2014 1   1  1 
2015  2  1 1 2 
2016  1  1  1 
2018 1  1 2  2 
Total 12 19 8 28 11 39 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Table 2. Distribution of sample by industry 
Industry  Number of IPOs Percent (%) 
Agri-food / production 3 7.69% 
Banks 1 2.56% 
Building & Construction Materials 3 7.69% 
Chemical 1 2.56% 
Community Services 1 2.56% 
Distributors 5 12.82% 
Electricity 1 2.56% 
Engineering & Industrial equipment 2 5.13% 
Finance companies & other financial activities 1 2.56% 
Hardware, Software & IT Services 6 15.38% 
Holding companies 1 2.56% 
Hospitality and Leisure 1 2.56% 
Insurance 3 7.69% 
Mines 1 2.56% 
Oil and gas 1 2.56% 
Pharmaceutical industry 2 5.13% 
Real estate investment and development 3 7.69% 
Real estate investment trusts 1 2.56% 
Transport 1 2.56% 
Transport Services 1 2.56% 
Total 39 100% 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Table 3. Valuation bias errors 
Panel A: General valuation bias errors 
 N Mean Std. dev 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
1st day market price : 
Fair value estimate 39 9.0143*** 9.0384 3.1579 7.8598*** 16.0247 -9.0909 30.7692 
Final offer price 39 -6.6905*** 4.6734 -9.0909 -9.0592*** -3.7770 -17.0732 10.7692 
Average 1st month market price : 
Fair value estimate 39 -0.9823*** 20.8015 -12.0810 -1.2294*** 16.8206 -49.4483 32.3950 
Final offer price 39 -15.2449*** 16.9381 -23.6975 -12.5272*** -1.2294 -57.1473 10.3994 
Panel B: Specific valuation bias errors 
 N Mean Std. dev 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
1st day market price : 
Fair value estimate 
Optimistic 33 11.4309*** 7.5095 6.8698 9.0079*** 16.8939 0.8902 30.7692 
Pessimistic 6 -4.2770*** 3.0688 -6.6667 -3.3569*** -2.1951 -9.0909 -0.9956 
Final offer price 
Optimistic 3 3.8326*** 6.0170 0.0233 0.7052*** 10.7692 0.0233 10.7692 
Pessimistic 36 -7.5674*** 3.3707 -9.0909 -9.0896*** -5.1587 -17.0732 -0.5525 
Average 1st month market price :         
Fair value estimate 
Optimistic 19 16.2238*** 8.4571 10.2345 16.8206*** 19.3466 2.8105 32.3950 
Pessimistic 20 -17.3281*** 14.8442 -30.7192 -10.1286*** -5.8384 -49.4483 -1.2294 
Final offer price 
Optimistic 6 5.8903*** 3.8161 2.3856 7.1850*** 7.9759 0.2109 10.3994 
Pessimistic 33 -19.0876*** 15.4737 -28.3298 -15.3873*** -8.5920 -57.1473 -0.5909 
Notes: Except for N, all figures are in percent (%). Significance is tested using a t-test for means and using a sign rank test for medians. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 4. Valuation accuracy errors 
Panel A: General valuation accuracy errors 
 N Mean Std. dev Ctl. tendency 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
1st day market price : 
Fair value estimate 39 10.3303***a 7.4542 69.2308 4.6018 7.8697***a 16.0247 .8902 30.7692 
Final offer price 39 7.2801***a 3.6587 97.4359 4.6667 9.0883***a 9.0909 .0233 17.0732 
Average 1st month market price : 
Fair value estimate 39 16.7901***a 12.0153 51.2821 6.7753 14.2523***a 26.5875 1.2294 49.4483 
Final offer price 39 17.0573***a 15.0604 56.4103 6.8372 12.5272***a 23.6975 .2109 57.1473 
Panel B: Specific valuation accuracy errors 
 N Mean Std. dev Ctl. tedency 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
1st day market price : 
Fair value estimate 
Optimistic 33 11.4309*** 7.5095 63.6364 6.8698 9.0079** 16.8939 .8902 30.7692 
Pessimistic 6 4.2770*** 3.0688 100.0000 2.1951 3.3569** 6.6667 .9956 9.0909 
Final offer price 
Optimistic 3 3.8326* 6.0170 100.0000 .0233 .7052 10.7692 .0233 10.7692 
Pessimistic 36 7.5674* 3.3707 97.2222 5.1587 9.0896 9.0909 .5525 17.0732 
Average 1st month market price :  
Fair value estimate 
Optimistic 19 16.2238 8.4571 42.1053 10.2345 16.8206 19.3466 2.8105 32.3950 
Pessimistic 20 17.3281 14.8442 60.0000 5.8384 10.1286 30.7192 1.2294 49.4483 
Final offer price 
Optimistic 6 5.8903*** 3.8161 100.0000 2.3856 7.1850** 7.9759 .2109 10.3994 
Pessimistic 33 19.0876*** 15.4737 48.4848 8.5920 15.3873** 28.3298 .5909 57.1473 
Notes: Except for N, all figures are in percent (%). Central tendency (Ctl. tendency) reports the percent of observations with an error accuracy inferior 
to 15%. Significance is tested using a t-test for means and using a sign rank test for medians. a Statistical significance using the natural log. ***, ** and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
Table 5. Valuation explainability of market prices 
Independent variables 1st day market price Average 1st month market price 
Fair value estimate 1.0327***  1.0495***  
Final offer price  1.0161***  1.0323*** 
Intercept -.2869 -.0275 -.2740 -.0083 
Adj. R² .9892*** .9962*** .9173*** .9231*** 
Notes: OLS univariate regression with robust errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
